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WHEN PERCEPTION CHANGES REALITY: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
INVESTORS’ VIEWS OF THE FAIRNESS OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION*
Jill I. Gross†& Barbara Black††
Arbitration in securities industry-sponsored forums is the primary mechanism to resolve
disputes between investors and their brokerage firms. Because it is mandatory, participants
debate its fairness, and Congress has introduced legislation to ban pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in customer agreements. Missing from the debate has been empirical research of
perceptions of fairness by the participants, especially investors. To fill that gap, we mailed
25,000 surveys to participants in recent securities arbitrations involving customers to learn their
views of the process. The article first details the survey’s background, explains the importance
of surveying perceptions of fairness, and describes our methodologies, procedures, and survey
error structure. We then present our findings, including our primary conclusions that (1)
investors have a far more negative perception of securities arbitration than all other
participants, (2) investors have a strong negative perception of the bias of arbitrators, and (3)
investors lack knowledge of the securities arbitration process. We also offer several
explanations for these negative perceptions. We conclude that customers’ negative perceptions
transform the reality faced by policy-makers and mandate reform of the process, including the
elimination of the industry arbitrator requirement and further public deliberation on the value of
the explained award.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past two decades, arbitration in forums sponsored by the securities industry1 has
been the primary mechanism2 for the resolution of disputes among investors, brokerage firms
and brokers.3 As a result of the virtually mandatory nature of the process,4 participants have
debated its fairness despite many improvements over the years. Many investor advocates argue
that securities arbitration is unfair, inefficient, expensive, and biased towards the securities
industry.5 The securities industry, on the other hand, contends that the arbitration process works
well, is faster and less expensive than litigation, and is fair to all the parties involved.6
The United States Congress has taken a recent interest in securities arbitration. In July
2007, both Houses introduced legislation to declare unenforceable pre-dispute arbitration
agreements (PDAAs) in consumer contracts.7 Senator Feingold, the bill’s sponsor in the Senate,
1

Until mid-2007, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) ran separate arbitration forums that handled a combined 99% of all securities arbitrations in the country.
On July 30, 2007, NASD and NYSE Regulation, including their respective arbitration forums, consolidated and
formed the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). See FINRA Press Release, NASD and NYSE Member
Regulation Combine to Form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority – FINRA (July 30, 2007), available at
http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2007NewsReleases/P036329. FINRA now operates the largest
dispute resolution forum in the securities industry. See What is FINRA Dispute Resolution?,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/WhatisDisputeResolution/index.htm (last
visited February 14, 2008).
2
Mediation is also utilized, if all parties consent. See Jill I. Gross, Securities Mediation: Dispute Resolution for the
Individual Investor, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 329 (2006).
3
In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court overruled prior law (Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)) and held that
brokerage firms could enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements in brokerage account customer agreements even as
to federal securities claims. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
4
See The Securities Arbitration System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and
Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 109th Cong. 13–14 (2005) [hereinafter
2005 Hearing] (statement of Constantine Katsoris, Wilkinson Professor of Law, Fordham University School of
Law) (testifying that McMahon “virtually transformed” securities arbitration “from a voluntary procedure to a
mandatory one”).
5
See Statement of the Public Investor Arbitration Bar Association (PIABA) in Connection with the Subcommittee’s
Review of the Arbitration System, available at
https://secure.piaba.org/piabaweb/html/modules/ContentExpress/img_repository/December122007.pdf (last visited
March 29, 2008); see also Mark A. Tepper, Survey Says – SRO Arbitration Unfair, PIABA BAR JOURNAL, Spring
2005, at 12; Charles Gasparino, Judging Wall Street, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6, 2004, at 56; Gary Weiss and David
Serchuk, Walled Off From Justice?, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 22, 2004, at 91; Richard Karp, Hardball, BARRON’S,
Oct. 20, 2003; see generally Edward Brunet & Jennifer Johnson, Substantive Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76
U. CIN. L. REV. __ (2008); Jennifer Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to
Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C. L. REV. 123 (2005).
6
See Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), White Paper on Arbitration in the Securities
Industry (2007), available at http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/pdf/arbitration-white-paper.pdf (last visited March
29, 2008) (hereinafter SIFMA White Paper). SIFMA “represents the industry which powers the global economy”
and has more than 650 member firms, see http://www.sifma.org/about/about.html.
7
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th
Cong. (2007).
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expressly stated that the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act would apply to PDAAs in securities
customers’ account agreements.8 Shortly before introducing the legislation, Senator Feingold
and Senator Patrick Leahy had written to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman
Christopher Cox urging the SEC to enact a rule banning mandatory arbitration clauses from
broker-dealers’ customer agreements.9 Both Senate and House subcommittees held hearings on
the proposed legislation in 2007,10 and a critic of the current securities arbitration process
testified at each of them.11 Previously, in March 2005, a subcommittee of the House of
Representatives Financial Services Committee held a hearing to better understand how the
securities arbitration process was working and whether any reforms were needed.12 At that
hearing, witnesses with expertise in securities arbitration testified about, and disagreed on the
ramifications of, many aspects of the process, including (1) its mandatory nature,13 (2) the
inclusion of one industry arbitrator on every three-arbitrator panel,14 and (3) a lack of
transparency in arbitrators’ decisions.15

8

Hearing on “S. 1782, The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007” Before the S. Judiciary Subcomm. on the
Constitution, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Senate Subcommittee Hearing] (opening statement of Sen. Russell
Feingold) (“First, [the Act] is intended to cover disputes between investors and securities brokers. I believe that
such disputes are covered by the definition of consumer disputes, but to clear up any uncertainty, we will make the
intent even clearer when we mark up the bill in committee.”).
9
See Letter from Russell D. Feingold, Senator, & Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S.
Senate, to Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC (May 4, 2007) (on file with author); see also Gretchen Morgenson,
“Dear S.E.C., Reconsider Arbitration,” N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2007, § 3, at 1.
10
Senate Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 8; Hearing on “H.R. 3010, The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007”
Before the H. Subcomm. On Commercial and Administrative Law, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter House
Subcommittee Hearing].
11
See Senate Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Tanya Solov) (representing the North American
Securities Administrators Association [NASAA]); House Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 10 (statement of
Theodore G. Eppenstein, Testimony in Support of Prohibiting Mandatory Arbitration in Securities Cases).
12
See 2005 Hearing, supra note 4.
13
Id. To open an account with virtually any broker-dealer, investors must sign an agreement that contains a clause
requiring them to settle any disputes in arbitration. This clause is regulated, both in form and content, by FINRA
Rules. See NASD CONDUCT RULE 3110(f).
14
At FINRA, if the claim is more than $50,000, the arbitration panel generally consists of three arbitrators. NASD
CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMER DISPUTES [hereinafter Customer Code] 12401(c). A threeperson arbitration panel consists of one non-public arbitrator, customarily referred to as an industry arbitrator, and
two public arbitrators, or arbitrators who are not associated with the securities or commodities industry. Customer
Code Rule 12402(b). The definitions of non-public and public arbitrators have engendered considerable debate in
recent years, as FINRA has tightened the definition of who can be considered a public arbitrator. The industry
arbitrator includes individuals who have been associated within the past five years with, or who are retired from, the
securities or commodities industry and professionals who have devoted at least 20% of their professional work in the
past two years to clients in the securities and commodities industry. Customer Code Rule 12100(p). An individual
who does not meet the definition of non-public arbitrator may, nevertheless, be outside the definition of a public
arbitrator under Customer Code Rule 12100(u) and thus be ineligible to serve as an arbitrator, even if otherwise
qualified. Investor advocates contend that the industry arbitrator “presents an appearance of bias and impropriety to

3

We both have written frequently on securities arbitration16 and have concluded that the
process is fair, when measured against hallmarks of procedural fairness.17 Our assessments were
based on our analysis of the rules and practices of the forum and our own experiences with the
process, both as investors’ representatives and as arbitrators. Missing from our assessment was
empirical data about the perceptions of fairness by the participants themselves, especially
investors who, although they are required to arbitrate their claims, are the least knowledgeable of
the process among the participants directly impacted by the arbitrators’ decisions.
In recent years, only a few researchers have conducted empirical studies of securities
arbitration, and none of them focuses on perceptions of fairness.18 The most recent attempt to
measure party satisfaction with securities arbitration dated back to 1999, before numerous rule
changes had altered the process.19 There was no recent reliable information about how
participants viewed their experience, and, in particular, whether investors viewed the arbitration

the investing public,” see 2005 Hearing, supra note 4, at 105 (statement of PIABA), while the securities industry
asserts that industry arbitrators provide valuable expertise. See SIFMA White Paper, supra note 6, at 36.
15
FINRA publicly discloses arbitration awards and during the arbitrator selection process provides information on
an arbitrator’s past awards, but arbitrators are not required to explain the award or their reasoning. See 2005
Hearing, supra note 4, at 34–35, 37 (statement of Fienberg). FINRA’s proposal to require arbitrators to include an
explanation for their awards at the request of the customer has languished in the rule-making process. See NASD
Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Provide Written Explanations in Arbitration Awards Upon the Request
of Customers or Associated Persons in Industry Controversies, 70 Fed. Reg. 41,065 (proposed July 11, 2005). For a
more detailed analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of this rule proposal, see Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, The
Explained Award of Damocles: Protection or Peril in Securities Arbitration, 34 SEC. REG. L.J. 17 (2006) [hereinafter
Explained Award of Damocles].
16
See, e.g., Explained Award of Damocles, supra note 15; Jill I. Gross & Ronald Filante, Ph.D, Developing A
Law/Business Collaboration through Pace'
s Securities Arbitration Clinic, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP AND FINANCIAL
LAW 57 (2005); Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why Do Brokerage Firms Need Judicial
Protection?, 72 U. CINC. L. REV. 415 (2003); Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Economic Suicide: The Collision of
Ethics and Risk in Securities Law, 64 PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW 483 (2003) [hereinafter Economic Suicide]; Barbara
Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 991, 999-1005 (2002) [hereinafter Making it Up].
17
See Jill Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CINC. L. REV.
__ (2008); Barbara Black, Is Securities Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 25 PACE L. REV. 1 (2004).
18
We describe these studies in Part V(G), infra. There are also empirical studies that focus on other forms of
arbitration. One that deals specifically with perceptions is Harris Interactive Survey, Arbitration: Simpler, Cheaper,
and Faster Than Litigation (Apr. 2005), at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/docload.cfm?docld=489
(conducted on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform, this survey interviewed 609
individuals and found general satisfaction with arbitration).
19
Gary Tidwell, Kevin Foster & Michael Hummel, Party Evaluations of Arbitrators: An Analysis of Data Collected
from NASD Regulation Arbitrations (Aug. 5, 1999), available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/med_arb/documents/mediation_arbitration/p009528.pdf (concluding that both
parties to the arbitration process found arbitrators, and the process itself, to be fair and unbiased) [hereinafter Tidwell
Report].
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process as fair. As a result, when the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA)20
sought to sponsor a new empirical study, we leaped at the opportunity.
This Article, based on our Report to SICA dated February 6, 2008,21 analyzes the results
of our mailed survey of participants’ perceptions of fairness of securities Self-Regulatory
Organization (SRO) arbitrations involving customers.22 Part II of this Article details the
background of the survey and explains the importance of surveying perceptions of fairness of a
dispute resolution process. Part III describes the methodologies and procedures we implemented
to design and conduct the survey, including the error structure potentially contained in our
methodologies. Part IV contains our findings. In Part V we present our analysis of the findings,
including our primary conclusions that (1) investors have a far more negative perception of
securities arbitration than all other participants, (2) investors have a strong negative perception of
the bias of arbitrators in the securities arbitration forum, and (3) investors lack knowledge of the
securities arbitration process. We also offer several explanations for these negative perceptions.
We conclude in Part VI by noting the implications of the findings, primarily the new reality that
Congress, the SEC and FINRA must face that customers’ negative perceptions mandate reform
of the securities arbitration process. Specifically, because we continue to believe that securities
arbitration is a better alternative than litigation, we do not agree that Congress or the SEC should
declare PDAAs unenforceable in customers’ account agreements with their brokerage firms. We
do urge that serious consideration be given to eliminating the requirement of an industry
arbitrator on every three-person arbitration panel. While we are less convinced about the
investor protection value of an explained award, our survey findings necessitate further public
discussion and debate on FINRA’s proposal to increase the transparency of securities arbitration
awards. At a bare minimum, the survey findings clearly highlight the need for all constituencies
to step up their efforts to educate investors as to the securities arbitration process.

20

SICA includes representatives from FINRA, SIFMA, and the public. See Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA: The
First Twenty Years, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 483, 488-90 (1996) (setting forth the background on the creation of
SICA).
21
Jill Gross & Barbara Black, Perceptions of Fairness of Securities Arbitration: An Empirical Study, Report to the
Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (Feb. 2008), available at
http://www.law.pace.edu/files/finalreporttosica.pdf. SICA sponsored the study, and FINRA paid for it.
22
For purposes of this study, SRO arbitrations include customer-initiated arbitrations at NASD Dispute Resolution
and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) filed from January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2006 and closed
between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2006. See infra Part III (B).
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II. SURVEYING PERCEPTIONS
A.

Background

In 2002 the State of California and the SROs were engaged in litigation over the state’s
attempt to impose its conflict disclosure standards on arbitrators in SRO securities arbitrations.23
The SEC24 filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the SROs’ position that federal regulation
preempted state standards and also requested that Professor Michael A. Perino25 assess the
adequacy of the current SRO arbitrator disclosure requirements.26 In the resulting report (“the
Perino Report”), Professor Perino concluded that the disclosure rules appeared to be adequate.
He went on to observe that any “lingering perceptions of pro-industry bias” relate to “panel
composition, not the presence of undisclosed arbitrator conflicts.”27 He further noted that, while
empirical evidence was limited, past surveys seemed to suggest that parties involved in SRO
arbitrations find that arbitrators are fair and impartial.28 However, because of “lingering
concerns about pro-industry bias” and the insufficient amount of empirical evidence addressing
investors’ perceptions of the securities arbitration process, Professor Perino recommended that
the “SROs sponsor additional independent studies to further evaluate the impartiality of the SRO
arbitration process.”29
In response to this recommendation, NASD asked SICA to conduct a study of
participants’ perceptions of the fairness of securities arbitration. On October 5, 2003, SICA
23

See NASD Dispute Resolution v. Judicial Council of California, 488 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2007) (dismissing appeal
because of mootness and vacating district court’s judgment); see also Credit Suisse First Boston v. Grunwald, 400
F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that federal securities law preempted the California standards in the context of
SROs); Jevne v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 4th 935 (2005) (to same effect).
24
The SEC has oversight authority over SRO securities arbitration pursuant to Section 19(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b), which requires SEC approval of any changes to the SRO securities
arbitration rules. The SEC is required to find that any proposed change is “consistent with the requirements of [the
34 Act] and the rules and regulations thereunder,” including the requirement that the rule protect investors and be in
the public interest . Id. § 78s(b)(2).
25
Dean George W. Matheson Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law.
26
See Michael Perino, Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission Regarding Arbitrator Conflict Disclosure
Requirements in NASD and NYSE Securities Arbitration at 3 (Nov. 4, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/arbconflict.pdf [hereinafter Perino Report].
27
Id.
28
Id. at 30. The Perino Report primarily was referring to two GAO studies (see Securities Arbitration: How
Investors Fare, GEN. ACCT. OFF., REP. NO. GGD-92-71 (1992) (finding that statistical results from industrysponsored and independent forums did not show any indication of a pro-industry bias in arbitration decisions at
industry-sponsored forums); Securities Arbitration: Actions Needed to Address Problem of Unpaid Award, GEN.
ACCT. OFF., REP. NO. GGD-00-115 (2000)(hereinafter 2000 GAO Report) (stating that there was no basis to make
any conclusions about the fairness of SRO arbitration proceedings, because the small caseloads at alternative forums
did not allow for meaningful comparisons)), and NASD’s Tidwell Report, supra note 19.
29
Id. at 37.
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disseminated a Request for Proposal seeking vendors interested in conducting the recommended
study. In 2004, we submitted a proposal to design a survey to investigate the fairness of SRO
arbitrations to the individual investor, focusing on an assessment of (1) investors’ perceptions of
fairness of the SRO arbitration process; (2) whether arbitrators appear competent to resolve
investors’ disputes with their broker-dealers; (3) investors’ perceptions of fairness of SRO
arbitration as compared to their perceptions of fairness in securities litigation in similar disputes;
and (4) whether the outcome of arbitrations appears fair to the parties. SICA accepted this
proposal and, on August 22, 2005, formally retained us to conduct the recommended study.
B.

The Importance of Perceptions of Fairness.

Academic literature confirms the importance of surveying perceptions of fairness of a
dispute resolution forum.30 These perceptions are important because the substantive (or
distributive) fairness of a dispute resolution process31 can not readily be measured, especially
when the process is confidential and outcomes are not transparent (which is the case in securities
arbitration because awards do not typically contain an explanation or reasons).
Dispute resolution scholars recently have focused on procedural justice as a more
accessible predictor than substantive justice of parties’ assessment of the overall fairness of a
process.32 These scholars have found that perceptions of procedural fairness strongly impact
perceptions of substantive fairness, which results in a greater willingness to comply with the
outcome and greater trust in and respect for the decision-maker.33 Summarizing prior research
30

See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, ADR Is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where It Fits In A System of Justice, 3 NEV.
L. J. 289, 297-98 (2003) [hereinafter ADR Is Here] (stating that the “subjective perception of fairness is critical,
because even assuming objective fairness, the system could not function well if it were perceived to be unfair or
unjust”).
31
A process is substantively fair if equally situated disputants receive equal outcomes. See Jean R. Sternlight,
Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 15 STAN. L. REV. 1637, 1666 (2005) [hereinafter Creeping Mandatory
Arbitration] (defining substantive, or distributive, justice and stating that “if a single party or group were to win all
disputes, if equally situated persons received disparate results, or if the ‘justice’ system led to increasingly unequal
division of resources, few if any of us would feel that justice had been served”).
32
See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S.CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004) (theorizing importance of procedural
justice for legitimacy of dispute resolution processes); Sternlight, ADR Is Here, supra note 30, at 297.
33
Susan Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute System Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 214-15
(2007) (“Empirical evidence suggests that when stakeholders believe a system is procedurally just, they are more
likely to buy into the result and the process, comply with the outcome, comply with the law in the future, increase
commitment to the organization, accord respect and loyalty to the institution, and perceive the system to be
legitimate.”); Nancy Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 165, 170 (Andrea K.
Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006); Deborah R. Hensler, Judging Arbitration: The Findings of
Procedural Justice Research, in AAA HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 41-49 (Thomas E. Carbonneau &
Jeanette A. Jaeggi eds., 2006); Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 31, at 1666-67 (citing
studies).
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by social psychologists, a leading scholar of procedural justice writes that “people who believe
that they have been treated in a procedurally fair manner are more likely to conclude that the
resulting outcome is substantively fair, even if that outcome is unfavorable.”34 She posits that
four key elements “reliably lead people to conclude that a dispute resolution process is
procedurally fair”: (1) the process provides an opportunity for disputants to voice their concerns
to a third party; (2) the disputants perceive that the third party actually considered these
concerns; (3) the disputants perceive that the third party treated them in an “even-handed” way;
and (4) the disputants feel that they were treated in a dignified and respectful manner.35
Our survey asked participants about their most recent experience with the SRO
arbitration process, including their perceptions about the attentiveness, competence and
impartiality of the arbitrators, as well as their satisfaction with the outcome. We also asked,
more generally, about their opinion of the securities arbitration process. From the survey, we
gain valuable insights about procedural and substantive fairness in securities arbitration cases as
experienced by the survey participants.
III.
A.

METHODOLOGIES AND PROCEDURES

Survey Development and Design.36

In late 2004, we began developing the survey and determined that the most effective way
to gather responses from all participants37 would be to disseminate a paper survey by mail.38
Mail surveys offer the following advantages: (1) they require fewer resources than telephone
surveys; (2) they provide a sense of privacy to the survey participant; and (3) they are less

34
Welsh, supra note 32, at 170; see also Hensler, supra note 33, at 48 (stating that “arbitration litigants will be
satisfied with arbitration if they think the process is fair and will be dissatisfied if they think the process is unfair”).
35
Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural and Social Justice
Theories, 54 J. LEGAL ED. 49, 52 (2004) (citing Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation:
What’s Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 787 (2001)); see also Hensler, supra note 33, at 48
(concluding that “any assessments of the procedural fairness of arbitration by arbitration litigants will depend on
several variables: whether they are allowed to participate in, or at least observe, the process firsthand; and whether
they believe the arbitrator is unbiased, gave fair consideration to their evidence, treated all parties equally, and
treated them in a dignified fashion”).
36
For a more detailed description, see SICA Report, supra note 21.
37
While our initial proposal contemplated surveying investors only, SICA instructed us to survey all process
participants, including investors, securities industry representatives, and lawyers.
38
We determined that an internet-based or telephone survey would not be feasible, primarily because NASD and
NYSE did not maintain sufficiently complete databases of e-mail addresses and telephone numbers for investors
who filed arbitration claims.
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sensitive to bias introduced by interviewers.39 We considered and weighted these advantages
against some disadvantages: (1) risk of noncoverage error (i.e., the database of recipients is
flawed); (2) risk of nonresponse error (i.e., those who respond are different from those who do
not respond in a substantive way that affects the survey results); (3) lack of control over who
within the household responds; and (4) risk that survey participants may not fill out the
questionnaire completely.40
Early on we retained the services of Cornell University’s Survey Research Institute
(SRI)41 to provide us with survey design and implementation expertise, and, with SRI’s input, we
drafted questions for the mail survey. We included four types of questions: (1) questions
requiring a binary response (e.g., “yes” or “no”), (2) categorical questions (requiring a response
from a list of viable options), (3) Likert scale questions (statements that could be answered by a
range of responses, such as strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly
disagree, don’t know), and (4) one open-ended question – the state in which a hearing was
scheduled to take place – to study any possible variations among geographic regions.
Within the statement section, we varied the orientation of the statements to include both
negative and positive statements. For example, question 16 asked survey participants to agree or
disagree with the statement: “The arbitration panel appeared competent to resolve the dispute.”
In contrast, question 17 asked survey participants to agree or disagree with the statement: “The
arbitration panel did not understand the issues involved in the case.” This type of contrast helps
to ensure that the participants were paying attention to the statements and also maintains the
neutrality of the survey.
We instructed survey participants who had been involved in more than one customer
dispute that was filed for arbitration to focus on their experiences in their most recent dispute, to
minimize survey participants’ reliance on more generalized impressions that can yield unreliable
data that is subject to “recall bias” or the tendency to exaggerate the consistency between present
attitudes and past experiences.42 While SICA initially expressed a preference for gathering
39

Priscilla Salant & Don A. Dillman, HOW TO CONDUCT YOUR OWN SURVEY (Wiley 1994), at 35-36.
Id. at 36-37.
41
Since 1996, SRI has been providing survey research, data collection, and analysis services to a wide-range of
academic, non-profit, governmental, and corporate clientele. For more information on SRI, see
http://www.cornellsurveyresearch.com/sri/index.cfm.
42
Research around memory bias reveals that personal recall of retrospective questions is a function of past and
present experiences. The typical finding is that people exaggerate the consistency between their present (new)
attitudes and their past opinions. Furthermore, people tend to bias their memories of previously held attributes in
40
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survey participants’ impressions based on numerous experiences, we explained that, to minimize
recall bias, it was important to avoid asking people about their impressions. Also, we wanted
this study, to the extent possible, to gather “information” rather than “impressions,” as
impressions are influenced or confounded by other factors for which a survey instrument cannot
accurately control. Moreover, the law of averages shows that a “terrible” recent experience
reported by one survey participant will smooth out against a “great” recent experience reported
by another survey participant. It was our view that survey data would be far more reliable and
scientifically accurate if we directed survey participants to focus on their most recent experience.
Ultimately, SICA agreed with our recommendation. We did, however, conclude the survey with
a series of questions that asked more generally for participants’ opinions about the securities
arbitration process.43
B.

Survey Recipients.

Simultaneously with survey development, we identified the parameters of the target
survey recipients. Both arbitration forums could generate a database of all parties and their
representatives who had participated in a customer-member arbitration and had provided their
contact information for a number of past years. Our objective was to generate contacts from two
years of recently closed cases, which we estimated to be a manageable and representative
population, but exclude cases that were filed earlier than five years ago and thus were
administered before numerous rule changes went into effect.
We determined that we would send out surveys to the following subset of individuals:
Contacts listed for all customer arbitrations filed at NASD and NYSE not earlier than
January 1, 2002 and closed between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2006;
(1)
Including contacts that were: on the case when it closed, removed due to a
bankruptcy order or other court order, or dismissed by arbitrator(s); and

ways that deny changes that have actually taken place or overstate them. The literature concludes that there are two
forms of systematic bias in personal memories: 1) people will exaggerate their consistency over time and
incorrectly recall events, tending to recall past events consistent with current events, or 2) people will overestimate
the extent to which their past memories differ from current experiences (sometimes a prominent/extreme event
occurred in the past overshadows all other events in the past). See J.M. Tanur, QUESTIONS ABOUT QUESTIONS
(Russell Sage Foundation, 1991); see also LinChiat Chang & Jon A. Krosnick, Measuring the Frequency of Regular
Behaviors: Comparing the “Typical Week” to the “Past Week,” 33 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY 55 (2003); S.
Sudman & N.M. Bradburn, RESPONSE EFFECTS IN SURVEYS (Aldine 1974).
43
Our proposal, as accepted by SICA, contemplated that we would conduct follow-up telephone interviews with
those survey participants who indicated a willingness to be interviewed. SICA later decided, however, that we
would not conduct telephone interviews.
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(2)
Excluding contacts from cases in which the initial pleading was not served (e.g.,
cases that were closed before service because a deficiency was not cured).
NASD and NYSE generated a combined database of 29,993 contacts to receive the
survey. Pace - with logistical assistance from NASD and NYSE -- mailed out the survey
between March and July 2007. SRI, under the supervision of Director Yasamin Miller, received
and processed results from April to August 2007. Through August 31, 2007, when data
collection closed, SRI received and processed 3,087 responses. This reflects a thirteen percent
(13.0%) response rate44 based on those surveys effectively mailed out to a contact,45 which is in
line with typical response rates ranging from eight to twelve percent obtained from a one-time
mailing of a survey.46
C.

Error Structure.

It is widely recognized that several sources of error can impact the quality of survey data.
It is also accepted practice for survey researchers to disclose the potential error structure in their
surveys. Our survey is subject to two possible sources of error: coverage error and nonresponse
error.
1.

Coverage error. The survey is subject to some coverage error, or the risk

that the results are not reliable because not all members of the population (NASD or NYSE
arbitration participants during a five-year time period) have an equal chance of being surveyed.
Specifically, it was less likely that investors who were represented by attorneys would receive
the survey compared to the other participants in the arbitration process.
As described above,47 we designed parameters for selecting a population of cases that
originated on or after January 1, 2002 (but eliminating arbitration participants in cases that had
not yet closed). The contacts database generated by our parameters was incomplete because the
forums do not require the parties to provide an address if they have a representative. Therefore,
many party addresses were missing or otherwise undeliverable. In addition, the database
44

Although we conservatively report 13% as the scientifically supported response rate, we firmly believe that the
actual rate is much higher, due to additional duplicates surely present on the mailing database but not officially
eliminated from the total recipient count. Due to the effort it would require to eliminate those duplicates, we chose
not to devote the time.
45
Of the 29,993 contacts, 4,710 surveys were either returned to SRI or otherwise not deliverable due to insufficient
address. Thus, we effectively mailed out a total of 25,283 surveys. We subsequently determined that at least 1500
of those contacts were duplicates. Thus, at most, 23,783 contacts had the opportunity to participate in the survey.
46
This range is derived from SRI’s experience over twenty years as well as the experience of other prominent
survey research organizations.
47
For further discussion of the parameters, see supra Part III (B).
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contained duplications for several reasons. First, entries for certain contacts appeared multiple
times if the data entered was just slightly different. While the forums electronically reviewed the
database to minimize the duplicates, they could not ensure that no contact received a duplicate
survey.48 Second, if a firm and one of its subsidiaries were listed as parties, the forums could not
limit the database to just the firm, resulting in certain firms with multiple listings. Third, in
situations where there were multiple parties with similar names and the same address, there were
multiple rows in the report. An example might be an individual, an IRA and a Trust all entered
as separate parties. As a result, lawyers, firms and associated persons in the database were more
likely to receive a survey than customers.
2.

Nonresponse bias. Nonresponse bias is the risk that those who responded

may be different in their answers to the survey questions from those who did not respond to the
survey. Because 13.0% of those who received a survey actually responded, our findings are
potentially limited by this nonresponse error.
The preferred method to test for nonresponse bias is to conduct telephone interviews of a
random sample of contacts who did not respond to measure whether their answers to the survey
questions are statistically significantly different from the survey participants. While we
recommended conducting such a follow-up study, due to time and resource constraints, SICA did
not endorse that recommendation. As a result, we cannot state with certainty whether there is, in
fact, any nonresponse bias in the survey data.
However, recent survey literature indicates that low response rates do not necessarily lead
to high nonresponse bias.49 At a recent national workshop on nonresponse bias, Robert M.
Groves, Professor of Sociology and Director of the Survey Research Center at the University of
Michigan and a leading scholar of survey research, argued that “a narrow focus on response rates
has likely been leading researchers astray from the more fundamental driver of non-response bias
- a relationship between the propensity of a household to respond and the value of that household

48

As described supra note 45, there were at least 1500 duplicates.
See, e.g., Robert M. Groves, Nonresponse Rates and Nonresponse Bias in Household Surveys, PUBLIC OPINION
QUARTERLY, Vol. 70, No. 5, Special Issue 2006, at 646-675 (emphasis added) (stating that “there is little empirical
support for the notion that low response rate surveys de facto produce estimates with high nonresponse bias”); John
Rogers, Ph.D, Do Response Rates Matter in RDD Telephone Survey?, Public Research Institute, Theory and
Method, at http://pri.sfsu.edu/corner.html (Nov. 13, 2006) (“The continued development of research on nonresponse
bias provides comforting news in that RDD surveys can still provide surprisingly accurate and reliable estimates
even in an era of declining response rates. But this same research also carries a warning that in some situations our
estimates can be biased in important ways by nonresponse.”).
49
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on a given survey measure.”50 Groves used a meta-analysis of nonresponse studies to provide
empirical support for this argument. Among his main conclusions are that (1) “response rate is
a poor indicator of non-response bias,” and (2) more variation in nonresponse bias exists
within surveys (between different estimates) than exists between surveys with higher or lower
response rates.51
FINDINGS52

IV.

The 3,087 returned surveys produced a large quantity of useful response data for analysis.
We have confidence in our findings due to the following factors:
We designed and administered the survey with a low error structure;53
A representative cross-section of target categories of arbitration participants
responded to the survey;54
Survey participants reflect a representative distribution of geographic regions;55 and
Survey participants reflect a representative cross-section of arbitration participants
based on the amount of the claim, the amount of damages awarded (if any), and the
manner in which the case was resolved.56
We describe in this section the responses to each of the thirty-eight questions and their subparts.
A.

Survey participant type

The first five questions and their subparts focused on categorizing the survey participants
and quantifying the level of survey participants’ involvement in securities arbitrations over the
past five years. Question 1 asked survey participants to identify the nature of their involvement
“in a dispute between a customer and a securities brokerage firm and/or its registered
representative(s) (‘associated person(s)’) that was filed for arbitration before NASD or the
NYSE.” The survey participants identified themselves as follows:
50

See American Association of Public Opinion Research, D.C. Chapter, Report on Workshop on Nonresponse Bias
in Household Surveys (Mar. 30, 2007), at 8.
51
Id. (italics in original). At the workshop, Groves remarked: "I must admit for me this was a shocker the first time
I saw it. This sort of rocks your belief system if you'
ve been training students for the last 30 years that high response
rates are really a good thing because it protects you from nonresponse bias.” Id.
52
When we report a percentage of survey participants, this figure reflects the percentage of “valid” survey
participants, or the percentage of those survey participants who answered that question.
53
See supra Part III (C).
54
See Figure 1A.
55
See Figure 9.
56
See infra Figures 10-12.
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Figure 1A
Nature of involvement
Customers
Corporate
representatives (of
member firms)
Associated persons
Lawyer/other party
representative
Not involved in any
such dispute

Number of survey
participants who
selected this response
1,359
202

Percentage of survey
participants who answered
this question
45.1
6.7

460
926

15.3
30.8

6357

2.1

Thus, the largest number of survey participants were customers (1,359, or 45.1% of those
who identified their role), followed by lawyers/other party representatives (926, or 30.8%).
This analysis of the distribution of type of survey participant led us to consider weighting
the responses based on this distribution as compared to the distribution of type of contact in the
mailing database. To ensure that a category of survey participants does not have the opportunity
to have its opinion counted disproportionally, accepted practice for survey researchers is to apply
post-stratified population weights to survey answers so as to adjust the impact of a participant
category on the overall answer for each question. However, researchers apply these weights only
if they have accurate classifications of both the contacts in the mailing database and survey
participants.58
Thus, we attempted to compare the classification distributions of survey participants to
the classification distributions of contacts in the mailing database:59

57

These 63 survey participants who answered that they were not involved in a customer arbitration in the past five
years were excluded from the remaining survey questions. Thus, totals of valid survey participants for other
categories could be no more than 3024 (3087-63).
58
See, e.g. Weighting for Unequal Pi, 8 JOURNAL OF OFFICIAL STATISTICS 183 (1992).
59
FINRA, the entity that maintained the mailing database, categorized the contacts database.
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Figure 1B
Category of contact
Customers

Percentage of contacts in
database
33%

Percentage of survey
participants
45%

Lawyers/representatives

37%

31%

Associated persons

23%

15%

Corporate representatives
(of member firms)

5%

7%

We concluded that we do not have sufficient confidence in the accuracy of these
classification percentages to justify weighting. We do not have confidence because:
FINRA has provided us with classifications for 97.5% of the contacts in the database;
756 records, or 2.5% of the 29,850 total contacts, could not be classified according to the
categories we used. Thus, we cannot classify 2.5% of the contacts.
We examined the detail of 1,570 NYSE records (99.6% of which were lawyers) and
9,445 NASD records (100% of which were lawyers) in the contacts database. Of those
combined records, at least 1,500 are duplicates. Thus, lawyers as a classification are
over-represented in the contacts database percentage by at least 5%. Moreover, in SRI’s
experience, participants do not fill out more than one survey.
77 survey participants, representing 2.5% of the 3,024 valid survey participants, did not
answer question one, but did answer other survey questions. Thus, we cannot classify
2.5% of the survey participants.60
Question 2 asked parties to a dispute whether they were represented by a lawyer in that
dispute. 81.7% (1,650) of those who identified themselves as a party to an arbitration proceeding
and who chose to answer the question reported that they were represented by a lawyer. Of the
remaining parties who chose to answer:
o 0.3% (6) were represented by a lawyer through a law school clinic;
o 1.7% (35) were represented by a non-lawyer; and
o 16.2% (328) represented themselves, either because:
60

Despite our lack of confidence in the weighting percentages to be applied, we tested the weights by assuming the
percentages as provided are accurate. We applied those weights to six questions (19, 34, 38a, 38b, 38c, and 38d).
With respect to the overall data, the weighted results showed only a marginal difference in the responses [slightly
more positive perceptions], and no trends or observations would be changed. With respect to the analysis of
customer vs. everyone else data, the customer numbers are unchanged; the “everyone else” numbers are changed
less than half of one-percent in every case except one. In sum, even if we were to apply the most extreme weights
we could envision applying, there would be no substantial change in the overall results.
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-

they did not want to be represented [5.4%],

-

they could not afford a lawyer [8.6%], or

-

they could not find a lawyer [2.2%].
61

Question 5 asked all parties as well as lawyers/representatives involved in more than
one dispute to provide the number of disputes in which they have been involved in the past five
years. 58.8% (1,510) of these survey participants (2,570) have been involved in only one
dispute. 75% of the survey participants who were involved in only one dispute who also
answered question one identified themselves as customers (1,115 out of 1,495). The breakdowns
are as follows:
Figure 5
Number of disputes involved
in - past five years
One
2-5
6-10
More than 10
Do not know
B.

Number of survey
participants who selected
this response
1,510
392
119
546
3

Percentage of survey
participants who
answered this question
58.8
15.3
4.6
21.2
0.1

Pre-dispute arbitration clause (PDAA)

Questions 6 through 11 asked all survey participants a series of questions about their
most recent dispute. Question 6 focused on the PDAA. Of the 2,841 responses, 79.3% of survey
participants (2,252) answered question 6(a) that the customer agreement in the most recent
dispute contained a PDAA. 7.3% of survey participants (208) answered that the customer
agreement did not contain a PDAA, suggesting that PDAAs in brokerage firm agreements are
prevalent, but not universal. 13.4% (381) of survey participants did not know or could not recall
whether the customer agreement contained such a clause.
Question 6(b) focused on the participants’ awareness of the PDAA before the dispute
arose. Of the 2,187 responses, 78.9% of survey participants (1,726) were aware that the customer
agreement contained a PDAA; 16% (351) were not aware; 5% (110) did not know. When
broken down by type of survey participant, the percentages shift in a statistically significant
61

We do not include the responses to questions 3 and 4, since they asked only lawyers or party representatives about
the nature of their representation in the past five years.
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manner. Thus, 63.29% of survey participants who answered this question and identified
themselves as customers (692 responses) were aware that the customer agreement contained a
PDAA before the dispute arose; 36.71% of customers were not aware.62
Question 7 asked the survey participants to provide the primary reason the dispute was
filed in an arbitration forum. As shown below, of the 2,790 responses, the largest number of
survey participants answered that the dispute was filed in an arbitration forum because it was
required.63 The final column reports the distribution of answers just for those survey participants
who identified themselves in response to question one as customers (1,197 responses). This
distribution is different in a statistically significant manner from the distribution for all survey
participants.
Figure 7
Primary reason for filing the
dispute in arbitration

Number of
survey
participants who
selected this
response

Percentage of
survey
participants
who answered
this question

Percentage of
customer survey
participants who
answered this
question

Believed arbitration was required

1,169

41.9

41.6

Did not initiate the claim

709

25.4

3.84

A lawyer recommended it

362

13.0

27.23

Believed arbitration would be less
expensive than court

204

7.3

13.45

Believed arbitration would be faster
than court

108

3.9

6.93

Do not know/do not recall

110

3.9

N/A

Believed arbitration would be more
fair than court

75

2.7

3.59

Preferred arbitration for other reasons

32

1.1

2.01

Believed arbitration would provide a
larger recovery than court

21

0.8

1.34

62

To ensure enough observations for a response choice in order to run a valid chi-square test, for this analysis and
all subsequent statistical analyses, we did not include the “do not know” response as a category if the response rate
for that choice was less than 5% or less than 150 responses. Thus, because fewer than 5% of customers answered
“do not know” to question 6(b), we eliminated that response from the “customer only” analysis.
63
When recalculated to exclude those survey participants who indicated that they did not initiate the claim, those
who filed in an arbitration forum because it was required totals 56.2%.
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C.

Concerns about arbitration before filing

Question 8 asked about parties’ concerns before the dispute was filed in arbitration. We
asked about their pre-filing concerns because we believe it is useful to compare the parties’
concerns before filing with the perception of the process after the case closed. Survey
participants indicated as follows:64
Figure 8
Concerns before
arbitration filed

Number of survey
participants who
selected this
response

I was concerned
that it would not be
a fair process
I had no concerns
I was concerned
that the arbitrators
would be biased
I was concerned
about the
composition of the
arbitration panel
I was concerned
that it would be
expensive
I was concerned
that it would be a
slow process
I had other
concerns
I don’t recall if I
had any concerns
D.

1,178

Percentage of survey
participants who
answered this question
who self-identified as a
non-customer65
40.1

Percentage who
answered this
question who selfidentified as a
customer
39.1

965
951

36.1
30.6

28
33.6

847

31.6

25

508

16.8

17.5

423

12.3

16.6

410

17.0

9.8

170

3.2

8.7

Geographic distribution

Question 9 asked survey participants to write the state in which the hearing was
scheduled to take place in their most recent dispute. If the dispute was a Simplified
64

The question instructed survey participants to select all that applied.
The difference between the answers for all survey participants and customers only was not statistically significant
for the choices regarding the cost and fairness of the process, and the bias of the arbitrator.

65
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Arbitration,66 the survey directed participants to write “paper case.” We then coded the 2,523
responses by region, according to FINRA Dispute Resolution’s four regions – Northeast,
Southeast, Midwest and West. The responses demonstrate that the survey participants represent
a fairly even cross-section of the four regions in the country:67
Figure 9
Region

Northeast
Southeast
Midwest
West
Paper case
E.

Number of
survey participants whose
hearing was scheduled to
take place in this region
559
586
526
644
208

Percentage of survey participants
who answered this question
22.16
23.23
20.85
25.53
8.24

Nature of most recent arbitration dispute

Questions 10-12 asked survey participants to identify certain parameters about the
dispute. Question 10 (2,947 responses) asked about the amount of damages claimed (excluding
punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, interest and costs) in the most recent dispute:
Figure 10
Amount of damages
claimed in most recent
dispute
Not exceeding $25,000
$25,001-$50,000
$50,001-$100,000
$100,001-$250,000
$250,001-$1,000,000
More than $1,000,000
Don’t know

Number of survey
participants who selected this
response
358
210
351
642
861
425
100

66

Percentage of survey
participants who answered this
question
12.1
7.1
11.9
21.8
29.2
14.4
3.4

Simplified Arbitration is required for claims of $25,000 or less. A single public arbitrator decides the dispute,
there is limited discovery, and a hearing is not conducted unless the customer requests it. Customer Code Rule
12800.
67
In 2006, NASD Dispute Resolution closed its Mid-Atlantic region, and realigned the regional office assignments
for several of its 68 hearing locations. Since not all hearing locations were reassigned to the same region, it is not
possible to compare the regional distributions of survey participants’ hearing location with the regional distribution
of the NASD and NYSE dockets during the same time period.
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Question 11 (2,885 responses) asked how the dispute was resolved:
Figure 11
How the most recent
dispute was resolved

Number

Award to customer after
hearing
Award to customer
based on papers
Claimant withdrew the
claim
Parties settled on their
own
Parties settled with aid
of mediator
No award to customer
based on papers
Dismissed before
hearing
No award to customer
after hearing
Do not know

676

Percentage of those who Percentage of customers
answered this question
who answered this
question (N=1237)
23.4
24.41

129

4.5

8.25

63

2.2

1.86

682

23.6

22.47

456

15.8

16.41

95

3.3

6.22

62

2.1

1.94

630

21.8

18.43

92

3.2

N/A

Only survey participants involved in a dispute that resulted in an award for the customer
answered question 12. Question 12a (789 responses) asked the amount of the total award
(excluding punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, interest and costs):
Figure 12A
Amount of damages
awarded in most recent
dispute
$1.00-$10,000
$10,001-$50,000
$50,001-$250,000
$250,001-$1,000,000
More than $1,000,000
Don’t know

Number of survey
participants who selected this
response
108
239
290
102
38
12

Percentage of survey
participants who answered
this question
13.7
30.3
36.8
12.9
4.8
1.5

Question 12b (786 responses) asked what percentage of damages originally claimed
(excluding punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, interest and costs) the award represents:
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Figure 12B
For awards, percentage of
damages originally
claimed
Less than 1%
1-10%
11-25%
26-49%
50-74%
75-99%
100%
Don’t know

Number of survey
participants who selected
this response
42
134
148
158
99
57
66
82

Percentage of survey
participants who answered
this question
5.3
17.0
18.8
20.1
12.6
7.3
8.4
10.4

These responses demonstrate that the survey participants represent a cross-section of
arbitration participants based on the amount of the claim, the amount of damages awarded (if
any), and the manner in which the case was resolved.68 No one type of arbitration participant
dominated the survey participants.
F.

Composition of arbitration panel

Questions 13-15 focused on the composition of the arbitration panel and any perceived
differences between public and industry arbitrators.69 Question 13 (2,898 responses) asked all
survey participants how many arbitrators were appointed to decide the dispute. 66.2% of survey
participants (1,919) reported that three arbitrators were appointed to decide the dispute; 16.1%
(466) reported that one arbitrator was appointed. In addition, 6.8% (197) answered that no
arbitrators were appointed; another 10.9% (316) did not know.
The survey directed those who responded that three arbitrators were appointed to answer
questions 14a-14e.
Q14a (1,817 responses): 47% (250) of customer-survey participants (531) knew, prior to
the filing of the arbitration, that one arbitrator would be an “industry arbitrator.” In
contrast, 94% (1,211) of all other types of survey participants (1,286) reported that they
knew this fact.

68

Although it would be instructive to compare the distribution of survey participants by how the dispute was
resolved to FINRA’s statistics on how its cases closed, comparisons are not possible because the categories FINRA
tracks are different from those tracked in this survey.
69
If the claim is more than $50,000, the arbitration panel generally consists of three arbitrators, one non-public
arbitrator, customarily referred to as an industry arbitrator, and two public arbitrators, or arbitrators who are not
associated with the securities or commodities industry. See supra note 14.
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Q14b (1,757 responses): 48% (244) of customer-survey participants (508) knew, at some
time during the dispute, which arbitrators were “public” and which arbitrator was
“industry,” compared to 88% (1,099) of all other types of survey participants (1,249) who
knew this information.
Q14c (1,878 responses): 24% (138) of customers (576) perceived a difference in
performance between the industry and public arbitrator, while 21.5% (124) of customers
did not perceive a difference. 42.8% (247) of customers reported that they had no
opportunity to assess the arbitrators’ performance; and 12% (67) of customers did not
know whether there was a difference. In contrast, for all other types of survey
participants (1302), 42% (543) did not perceive a difference; 28% (368) had no
opportunity to assess; 25% (325) perceived a difference; and 5% (67) did not know.
Q14d (1,748 responses): 36.5% (186) of customers (510) perceived that the industry
arbitrator favored at least one securities party at some time during the dispute; 22% (122)
of customers disagreed that the industry arbitrator favored one side over the other at any
time during the dispute; 1.8% (9) perceived that the industry arbitrator favored the
customer; and 39.8% (203) of customers had no opportunity to assess the performance of
the industry arbitrator. In contrast, for all other types of survey participants (1,238): 50%
(618) disagreed that the industry arbitrator favored one side over the other at any time
during the dispute; 15.3% (189) perceived that the industry arbitrator favored at least one
securities party; 7.7% (95) perceived that the industry arbitrator favored the customer;
and 27.1% (336) had no opportunity to assess the performance of the industry
arbitrator.70
Question 15 (2,250 responses) asked whether any public arbitrator favored one side over
the other at any time during the dispute. 24.2% (213) of customers (881) responded that the
public arbitrator did not favor one side over the other at any time during the dispute; 28.7% (253)
said the public arbitrator favored at least one securities party; 2.2% (19) of customers said that
the public arbitrator favored the customer; 33.37% (294) said there was no opportunity to assess;
and 11.58% (102) did not know or recall. In contrast, for all other types of survey participants
(1,369), 49% (671) responded that the public arbitrator did not favor one side over the other at
any time during the dispute: 7.7% (105) said the public arbitrator favored at least one securities
party; 13.2% (181) said that the public arbitrator favored the customer; 24.3% (332) said there
was no opportunity to assess; and 5.8% (80) said that they did not know or recall.
Notably, the differences in customer-only vs. all survey participant types for responses to
questions 14a-15 were statistically significant.

70

Question 14e asked participants whether the award in their most recent three-arbitrator dispute was unanimous or
not. Because the number of survey participants who answered this sub-question was so low, perhaps because of the
sub-question’s assumption that there was an award, we do not include data for this sub-question.
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G.

Statements seeking range of responses (Likert scale questions)

Questions 16-34 are “Likert scale” questions that directed survey participants to read a
statement and then indicate their response to that question as “strongly agree, agree, neither agree
nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.” Each statement also supplied a “not applicable” as
well as a “don’t know” option. For these questions, survey participants were reminded to based
their responses on their most recent dispute in which they were involved.
The following charts provide the statement and the range of responses distributed by
percentage with respect to two categories of survey participants: those who identified themselves
as customers and those who identified themselves as non-customers, in order to determine
whether customers’ responses were different from the responses of the other survey participants
(excluding “not applicable” responses). In general, customers had more negative perceptions,
based on their most recent experience, of the arbitration process. In addition, in some questions,
the customers expressed a greater lack of knowledge about the process than other survey
participants. For all questions, the differences were statistically significant.
Figure 16
The arbitration panel appeared competent to resolve the dispute
(N = 2115)

80
70
Percent

60

69.68
54.5

50
40

27.13

30

18.37

20

Customer (N=822)

19.88

10.44

10
0
Strongly Agree / Agree

Neither Agree nor
Disagree

23

Disagree / Strongly
Disagree

Everyone Else
(N=1293)

Figure 17
The arbitration panel did not understand the issues involved in the case
(N = 2263)
56.04

60
Percent

50
40
30

37.91

30.68
27.06

20

17.49

13.93 12.16

10

Customer (N=955)
Everyone Else (N=1308)
4.74

0
Strongly Agree / Neither Agree nor
Disagree /
Agree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

Do Not Know

Figure 18
The arbitration panel was open-minded
(N = 2280)
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49.43

Percent

50

40.04

40
30

28.6

27.97

20

12.18

Customer (N=969)
Everyone Else (N=1311)

19.81

15.03

6.94

10
0
Strongly Agree / Neither Agree nor
Disagree /
Agree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

Do Not Know

Figure 19
The arbitration panel was impartial
(N = 2275)

60
47.82

Percent

50

40.58

40
30
20
10

31.25
24.84

Customer (N=966)
Everyone Else (N=1309)

21.12
13.46 14.59

6.34

0
Strongly Agree / Neither Agree nor
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Agree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

24

Do Not Know

Figure 20
The arbitration panel appeared competent to resolve pre-hearing issues

Percent

(N = 2271)
70
60
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Do Not Know

Figure 21
The discovery process enabled me to obtain the information
needed for a hearing
60
50
Percent

40

(N = 2392)

56.12
39.76
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Figure 22
The arbitration hearings took too long
(N = 1908)
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Figure 23

Percent
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Q. 24 - At the hearing, the arbitration panel understood the legal
arguments in the case
(N = 1934)
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Figure 25
At the hearing, the arbitration panel did not provide a sufficient
amount of time for the parties to present their evidence
(N = 1893)
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Figure 26
Q. 26 - At the hearing, the arbitration panel did not provide a sufficient
amount of time for the parties to argue the merits of their case
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Figure 27
I am satisfied with the outcome
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Figure 28
I would be more satisfied if I had an explanation of the award
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Figure 29
The outcome was not very different from my initial expectations
(N = 2375)
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Figure 30
The arbitration process was too expensive
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Figure 31
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Figure 32
I would recommend to others that they use arbitration to resolve
their securities disputes
(N = 2418)
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Figure 33
I have a favorable view of securities arbitration for customer disputes
(N = 2509)
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Figure 34
As a whole, I feel that the arbitration process was fair
(N = 2446)
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Arbitration vs. litigation

Question 35 asked survey participants if, in the last five years, they had been a party or
represented a party in at least one civil court case (not involving a criminal, matrimonial or
custodial matter and excluding class action lawsuits). Of the total responses (3,024), 59.6%
(1,802 responses) said no. The others (1,222 responses) stated their involvement as follows:71
Figure 35
Nature of involvement in
a civil case
None
Plaintiff in civil case
Represented plaintiff in
civil case
Defendant in civil case
Represented defendant in
civil case
Do not know/do not recall

Number of survey
participants
1,802
195
563

Percentage of survey participants who
answered this question
59.6
6.4
18.6
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19.3

42
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The survey directed those survey participants who indicated they were involved in a civil
case in the last five years to answer questions 35a and 35b, which asked them to compare their
experiences in court and arbitration.72 Question 35a (1,084 responses) instructed survey
71

The totals add up to more than 1,222 because this question directed survey participants to select all that applied.
For both questions 35a and 35b, the number of customer survey participants who answered the question is far
lower than the total number of survey participants who answered this question, thus making the comparisons
between the two less meaningful.
72

30

participants to focus on their most recent experience in a civil court case and asked how different
they thought the result from the arbitration would have been had it proceeded in court.
Figure 35A
How different in
court

Number of survey
participants who
selected this
response

Percentage of those who Percentage of
answered this question
customers who
(N=1,084)
answered this
question
(N=168)
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Do not know
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16.4

51.8
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4.17
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Question 35b (1,088 responses) asked those same survey participants about the fairness
of securities arbitration as compared to their most recent experience in a civil court case. While
30.9% found arbitration “very fair” or “somewhat fair,” another 48.9% found arbitration “very
unfair” or “somewhat unfair.” In contrast, only 17% of customer-survey participants found
arbitration “very fair” or “somewhat fair,” and a striking 75.55% of customers found arbitration
“very unfair” or “somewhat unfair.”
Figure 35B
How fair is securities
arbitration as
compared to court?
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Question 36 (2,947 responses) asked all survey participants if, based on their experiences
in one or more customer arbitrations, given the choice, they would choose arbitration to resolve a
customer dispute in the future. 24.65% (335) of customers (1,359) said they would, in

31

comparison with 46% (730) of all other participants (1,588). In contrast, 35% (473) of
customers said they would not choose arbitration because it is unfair, in comparison with 25%
(395) of all other participants. The breakdown of all responses, as well as by customer-survey
participants, is as follows:73
Figure 36
Would you choose
arbitration in the future?
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I would not choose arbitration
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competent to resolve
customer-broker disputes
I would not choose arbitration
because it is more expensive
None of the above
I would not choose arbitration
because it takes more time

Number of survey
participants who
selected this
response
1,065

Percentage of
non-customers
who answered
this question
46

Percentage of
customers who
answered this
question
24.7

868

24.9

602
472

15.9
15.9

25.8
16.2

218

8.4

6.18

133

4.5

4.5

34.8

We then asked, in question 37 (2,857 responses), all survey participants whether they
were familiar with procedural rule changes made by the forums in the past five years and, if so,
their opinion of the changes. 93% (1,213) of customers (1,306) said they were not familiar with
the changes, in comparison with 40% (623) of all other participants (1,551).74
I.

Overall perceptions of arbitration

Finally, question 38 asked all survey participants the extent to which they agreed or
disagreed with four statements regarding the securities arbitration process. For these questions,
the survey participants were asked their “opinion” and were not instructed to focus on their
experience in their most recent dispute.

73

The question directed survey participants to select all that applied.
We do not provide the opinions of customers who said they were familiar with the changes because there were so
few of them.

74
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Figure 38a (N=2617)
Arbitration was Simple for All Parties
Customers = 1109; All Others = 1508
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Figure 38b (N=2613)
Arbitration was Fair for All Parties
Customers = 1104; All Others = 1509
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Figure 38c (N=2824)
Arbitration was Economical for All Parties
Customers = 1268; All Others = 1556
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Figure 38d (N=2826)
Arbitration was Without Bias for All Parties
Customers = 1273; All Others = 1553
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS
This survey gathered a wealth of useful data that adds to the current understanding of
participants’ perceptions of the fairness of securities arbitration. Our analysis of the data
indicates that, overall, survey participants’ perceptions of securities arbitration are nuanced,
complex and resist summary categorization. Individual investors (customers), however, spoke
with a clearer voice. As discussed below, customers have more negative views about their most
recent securities arbitration experience than all other participants (as a group) in the process.
A. Customers Have a Favorable View of Arbitrators’ Attentiveness and Competence
A majority of customers gave positive assessments, based on their experience at their
most recent dispute, of the arbitrators’ attentiveness at the hearing and their competence, as well
as the sufficiency of time at the hearing to argue the merits of the case (although, for each
question, customers’ responses were less favorable than those of all other participants as a
group). Thus:
•

74% of customers agreed with the positive statement that “at the hearing, the arbitration
panel listened to the parties, their representatives and their witnesses,” while 20% of
customers disagreed with the statement. In comparison, 84% of all other participants
agreed with the statement, and 10% of all other participants disagreed with it.75

•

54.5% of customers agreed with the positive statement that “the arbitration panel
appeared competent to resolve the dispute,” while 27% of customers disagreed with the
statement. In comparison, 70% of all other participants agreed with the agreement, and
20% of all other participants disagreed with it.76

•

54% of customers disagreed with the negative statement that “at the hearing, the
arbitration panel did not provide a sufficient amount of time for the parties to argue the
merits of their case,” while 28% of customers agreed with the statement. In comparison,
79% of all other participants disagreed with the statement, and 9% of all other
participants agreed with it.77

A high percentage of customers also expressed general satisfaction about other aspects of the
performance of the arbitrators, based on their most recent experience (although, again, they did
not give them as high marks as did all other participants). Thus,
•

47% of customers disagreed with the negative statement that “at the hearing, the
arbitration panel did not provide a sufficient amount of time for the parties to present
their evidence,” while 19% of customers agreed with the statement. In comparison, 77%
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Figure 23.
Figure 16.
77
Figure 26.
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of all other participants disagreed with the statement, and 8% of all other participants
agreed with it.78
•

40% of customers agreed with the positive statement that “the arbitration panel appeared
competent to resolve pre-hearing issues,” while 22% of customers disagreed with the
statement. In comparison, 61% of all other participants agreed with the statement, and
23% of all other participants disagreed with it.79

•

40% of customers agreed with the positive statement that “the discovery process enabled
me to obtain the information necessary for a hearing,” while 29% of customers disagreed
with the statement. In comparison, 56% of all other participants agreed with the
statement, and 29% of all other participants disagreed with it.80

•

38% of customers disagreed with the negative statement that “the arbitration panel did
not understand the issues involved in the case,” while 31% of customers agreed with the
statement. In comparison, 56% of all other participants disagreed with the statement, and
27% of all other participants agreed with it.81

•

38% of customers agreed with the positive statement that “at the hearing, the arbitration
panel understood the legal arguments in the case,” while 24% of customers disagreed
with the statement. In comparison, 53% of all other participants agreed with the
statement, and 28% of all other participants disagreed with it.82
Customers were about equally divided on whether “the arbitration hearings took too

long,” with 36% of customers disagreeing with the negative statement and 35% of customers
agreeing with it. In comparison, 44% of all other participants disagreed with the negative
statement, and 33% of all other participants agreed with it.83 Finally, 35% of customers believed
that the arbitrators “did not apply the law to decide the dispute,” while 17% of customers
disagreed with that statement. If customers believe that arbitrators should apply the law, then
that is a negative assessment of their performance. In comparison, 39% of all other participants
believed that the arbitrators did not apply the law, and 35% of all other participants disagreed
with the statement.84

78

Figure 25.
Figure 20.
80
Figure 21.
81
Figure 17
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Figure 24. This rare instance where all other participants have a greater negative response to a positive statement
than the customers may reflect the likelihood that all other participants have a better understanding of the legal
principles, because 23% of customers said “they did not know,” compared with 6% of all other participants.
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B. A Significant Percentage of Customers Believe the Arbitration Panel is Biased
The questions that generated the most negative customer reactions asked about
perceptions of arbitrator impartiality, based on their most recent experience in arbitration. Thus:
•

41% of customers disagreed with the positive statement that “the arbitration panel was
impartial,” while 25% of customers agreed with it. In comparison, 31% of all other
participants disagreed with the statement, and 48% of all other participants agreed with
it.85

•

40% of customers disagreed with the positive statement that “the arbitration panel was
open-minded,” while 28% of customers agreed with it. In comparison, 29% of all other
participants disagreed with the statement, and 49% of all other participants agreed with
it.86
Customers were more equivocal, however, when asked directly to compare the

performance of the public and the industry arbitrator, perhaps because many of them had no
opportunity to assess the arbitrators’ performance.87 Thus,
•

24% of customers perceived a difference between the performance of the public
arbitrators and the industry arbitrator, while 21.5% of customers said there was no
difference. In comparison, 25% of all other participants perceived a difference, and 42%
did not.88

•

36.5% of customers perceived that the industry arbitrator favored at least one securities
party, while 22% of customers disagreed with the statement that the industry arbitrator
favored one side over the other. In comparison, 15% of all other participants perceived
that the industry arbitrator favored at least one securities party, and 50% of all other
participants disagreed with the statement that the industry arbitrator favored one side over
the other. 2% of customers answered that the industry arbitrator favored the customer,
compared with 8% of all other participants89

•

29% of customers said the public arbitrator favored at least one securities party, while
24% of customers responded that the public arbitrator did not favor one side over the

85

Figure 19. A small number of survey participants answered this question while indicating in response to question
11 that their most recent dispute did not progress to a hearing. Thus, a small number of responses to this question
appear to be based on perceptions derived from something other than those participants’ experiences at a hearing in
their most recent dispute that was filed for arbitration. This observation also applies to the data for questions 22
through 26.
86
Figure 18.
87
43% of customers said that they had no opportunity to assess the performance of the public vs. the industry
arbitrator, compared with 28% of all other participants (Question 14c), 40% of customers said they had no
opportunity to assess the performance of the industry arbitrator, compared with 27% of all other participants
(Question 14d), and 33% of customers said there was no opportunity to assess the performance of the public
arbitrator, compared with 24% of all other participants (Question 15).
88
Figure 14c.
89
Figure 14d.

37

other at any time during the dispute, and 2% of customers said that the public arbitrator
favored the customer. In comparison, 8% of all other participants said the public
arbitrator favored at least one securities party, 49% of all other participants said that the
public arbitrator did not favor one side over the other at any time during the dispute, and
13% of all other participants said that the public arbitrator favored the customer.90
C. Customers Are Dissatisfied With The Outcome
Customers expressed strong dissatisfaction with the outcome of their most recent
securities arbitration case. An overwhelming 71% of customers disagreed with the positive
statement that “I am satisfied with the outcome,” and only 22% of customers agreed with that
statement. In comparison, the responses of all other participants were about equally divided,
with 45% disagreeing with the statement and 46% of all other participants agreeing with it.91
Furthermore, a majority of customers (56%) disagreed with the positive statement that “the
outcome was not very different from my initial expectation,” while 30% of customers agreed
with the statement. In comparison, 36% of all other participants disagreed with the statement,
and 47% of all other participants agreed with it.92 We cannot, of course, assess the basis for their
initial expectations or their reasonableness. As expected, upon closer examination, a party’s
satisfaction rates tended to decrease in direct correlation to that party’s degree of success in
his/her most recent dispute as measured by his/her response to questions 11 (manner of
resolution) and 12b (percentage of damages originally claimed that were actually awarded).
Moreover, 55% of customers agreed with the negative statement that “I would be more
satisfied if I had an explanation of the award,” and only 25% of customers disagreed with that
statement. In comparison, 44% of all other participants said they would be more satisfied if they
had an explanation, and 36% of all other participants disagreed with the statement.93 We cannot
assess whether this response is more a reflection of their dissatisfaction with the outcome than an
actual desire for an explanation. Over two years ago, NASD proposed changing the arbitration
rules to require arbitrators to issue an explained award if the customer requests it.94 It remains to
be seen whether these findings will provide momentum for FINRA’s revival of the proposal.
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See supra note 15.
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D. Customers Do Not Believe Arbitration Compares Favorably To Litigation
The survey asked participants to compare their experience in arbitration to a comparable
litigation experience.95 Because of the small number of customers who answered these
questions, we believe the responses are of limited utility. Moreover, because so few customerbroker disputes have proceeded through the courts in the last twenty years, we do not believe
those who responded to this question could have been making a valid comparison. However,
from the perspective of those customers who responded, arbitration fared poorly by
comparison.96
All survey participants were asked if, based on their overall arbitration experience, given
the choice, they would choose arbitration to resolve a customer dispute in the future. 35% of
customers responded that they would not choose arbitration because it is unfair, 25% of
customers said they would choose arbitration, and another 26% of customers were not sure. In
comparison, 25% of all other participants said they would not choose arbitration because it is
unfair, 46% of all other participants said they would choose arbitration, and 16% said they were
not sure.97
Particularly with respect to customers, who are unlikely to have had any comparable
litigation experience,98 these responses may be best explained as a reflection of their
dissatisfaction with their arbitration experience – “anything else must be better than this.”
E.

Customers Lack Knowledge of the Securities Arbitration Process

Perhaps our most consistent – though not surprising -- finding was the lack of knowledge
of customers about securities arbitration. Individual investors stated that they have less
knowledge about the arbitration process more frequently than other participants in the process.
Some of this lack of knowledge relates to the composition of the arbitration panel. Thus,
•

47% of customers knew, prior to the filing of the arbitration, that one arbitrator would be
an “industry arbitrator,” compared with 94% of all other participants.99
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Figure 35a and b.
See supra Figure 35b.
97
Figure 36.
98
Since the Supreme Court declared PDAAs enforceable in all customer disputes, supra note 3, few customers have
been able to litigate their claims, as reflected in the small number of customers who responded to questions 35a and
b, supra note 72.
99
Figure 14a.
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•

48% of customers knew, at some time during the dispute, which arbitrators were “public”
and which arbitrator was “industry,” compared with 88% of all other types of survey
participants.100
Customers also stated they “did not know” in response to questions assessing the

arbitrators’ performance more frequently than all other participants as a group. Customers may
answer “do not know” because they believe they do not have sufficient knowledge of the
substantive and procedural law governing arbitration to answer these questions. Thus,
•

33% of customers said they did not know whether “the arbitration panel did not apply the
law to decide the dispute,” compared to 11% of all other participants.101

•

24% of customers said they did not know whether “the arbitration panel appeared
competent to resolve pre-hearing issues,” compared with 6% of all other participants.102

•

23% of customers said they did not know whether “at the hearing, the arbitration panel
understood the legal arguments in the case,” compared with 6% of all other
participants.103

•

21% of customers said they did not know whether “the arbitration panel was impartial,”
compared with 6% of all other participants.104

•

20% of customers said they did not know whether “the arbitration panel was openminded,” compared with 7% of all other participants.105

•

18% of customers said they did not know whether “at the hearing, the arbitration panel
did not provide a sufficient amount of time for the parties to present their evidence,”
compared with 4% of all other participants.106

•

17% of customers said they did not know whether “the arbitration panel did not
understand the issues involved in the case,” compared with 5% of all other
participants.107

•

12% of customers said they did not know or did not recall whether the public arbitrator
favored one side over the other at any time during the dispute, compared with 6% of all
other participants.108
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Moreover, in responses to some other questions that relate to aspects of arbitration other
than arbitrators’ performance, customers said they “did not know” more frequently than all other
participants. This expression of lack of knowledge, again, may reflect less familiarity with the
substantive law and arbitration procedure than what all other participants are likely to have. For
example, 18% of customers said that they did not know whether “the discovery process enabled
me to obtain the information necessary for a hearing,” compared with 4% of all other
participants.109 So few customers indicated familiarity with recent changes in arbitration rules
that we did not tabulate their responses to this question.110
It is certainly not surprising that many customers express less knowledge of the process
since, unlike the other participants, few of them are likely to be lawyers with an expertise in this
area or members of the securities industry. While customers may believe (rightly or wrongly)
that they have a good understanding of other aspects of the judicial system – for example,
criminal trials which are frequently featured in popular media both in fictionalized and real-life
accounts – they are less likely to believe this about a specialized process whose proceedings do
not make headlines, are kept confidential and are not the subject of television shows. While
investors’ lack of knowledge may color their views of their most recent securities arbitration
experience, we have no basis to assume it results in a more negative assessment. It does indicate,
however, that the forum and customers’ lawyers111 need to step up their efforts to educate
investors about brokerage firms’ legal duties to their customers and, in particular, the securities
arbitration process.
F. Customers Have Unfavorable Perceptions Overall of the Fairness of Securities
Arbitration.
Our study found that customers express a consistently negative impression of the overall
arbitration process, whether based on their most recent experience or on their general
impressions. Thus, 63% of customers did not believe that, overall, the process was fair,112 60%
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Figure 21.
Figure 37.
111
We have heard anecdotally about investors’ complaints that their lawyers misled them about their chances of
success in arbitration, about the cost and/or length of the process, and about the anti-investor securities laws.
112
Specifically, 63% of customers disagreed with the positive statement that “as a whole, I feel the arbitration
process was fair,” and 28% of customers agreed with the statement. In comparison, 40% of all other participants
disagreed with the statement, and 51% of all other participants agreed with it. Figure 34.
110
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of customers did not have a favorable view of arbitration,113 52% of customers would not
recommend arbitration to others,114 and 49% of customers said it was too expensive.115
Moreover, when directed to respond based on their overall impressions of the fairness of
the securities arbitration process, customers responded even more negatively than when directed
to focus on their most recent arbitration experience.116 Thus,
•

61% of customers disagreed with the statement that “arbitration was fair for all
parties,” 25% of customers agreed with the statement, and 14% of customers neither
agreed nor disagreed with the statement. In comparison, 44% of all other participants
disagreed with the statement, 45% of all other participants agreed with the statement,
and 11% of all other participants neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement.117

•

49% of customers disagreed with the statement that “arbitration was without bias,”
19% of customers agreed with the statement, 19% of customers said they did not
know, and 13% of customers neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. In
comparison, 41% of all other participants disagreed with the statement, 40% of all
other participants agreed with the statement, 5% of all other participants said they did
not know, and 14% of all other participants neither agreed nor disagreed with the
statement.118

•

45.5% of customers disagreed with the statement that “arbitration is simple for all
parties,” and 37% of customers agreed with the statement. In comparison, 29% of all
other participants disagreed with the statement, and 54% of all other participants
agreed with it. An equal percentage (18%) of customers and all other participants
neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement.

•

37% of customers disagreed with the statement that “arbitration is economical for all
parties,” 28% of customers agreed with the statement, 20% of customers neither

113

60% of customers disagreed with the positive statement that “I have a favorable view of securities arbitration for
customer disputes,” and 28% of customers agreed with the statement. In comparison, 41% of all other participants
disagreed with the statement, and 45% of all other participants agreed with it. Figure 33.
114
52% of customers disagreed with the positive statement that “I would recommend to others that they use
arbitration to resolve their securities disputes,” and 32% of customers agreed with the statement. In comparison,
34% of all other participants disagreed with the statement, and 49% of all other participants agreed with it. Figure
32.
115
49% of customers agreed with the negative statement that “the arbitration process was too expensive,” and 25%
of customers disagreed with the statement. In comparison, 44% of all other participants agreed with the statement,
and 36% of all other participants disagreed with it. Figure 30.
116
These findings must be reconciled with the reality that customers are likely to have had only one experience with
the process. Surveyors typically devalue answers to questions seeking impressions because they are much more
subject to recall bias. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. The fact that customers’ impressions were more
negative than for their most recent experience, even though most of the population likely only had one experience,
lends support to the hypothesis that recall bias and other factors other than their actual experience contributed
greatly to their negative perceptions.
117
Figure 38b.
118
Figure 38d.
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agreed nor disagreed with the statement, and 15.5% of customers did not know. In
comparison, 35% of all other participants disagreed with the statement, 42% of all
other participants agreed with the statement, 18% of all other participants neither
agreed nor disagreed with the statement, and 5% of all other participants did not
know.119
In the next section, we explore some possible explanations for these consistently negative
impressions.
G. Explanations for Customers’ Negative Perceptions
Because the survey (intentionally) did not ask open-ended questions, we can offer only
theories explaining customers’ negative perceptions about the fairness of securities arbitration.120
Our first three theories directly stem from the process itself; our remaining theories stem from
more remote factors.
1.

Explanations Related to the Process.

Securities Arbitration is Unfair. One explanation may be that securities arbitration is, in
fact, unfair. Indeed, certain of our survey data buttresses this conclusion: while 39% of
customers had concerns about the fairness of the process before they filed their dispute with the
arbitration forum,121 a disturbing 63% of customers do not agree that, after their most recent
arbitration experience, the process was fair.122 We were particularly struck by the fact that
customers’ level of discontent increased by more than 20 percentage points after going through a
securities arbitration proceeding.
Moreover, all recent studies of outcomes based on published awards show a decline in
investors’ win rates in recent years, providing some support for this theory.123 First, Empirical
Evidence of Worsening Conditions for the Investor in Securities Arbitration,124 a 2002 report,
concluded that conditions have worsened over time for investors: their success rate has declined,
brokers are more likely to prevail on their counterclaims, and repeat players have a competitive
advantage. Second, a 2007 study entitled Mandatory Arbitration of Securities Disputes: A
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Figure 38c.
We had hoped to explore some of these theories in follow-up telephone interviews with survey participants who
expressed a willingness to speak about their experience, but SICA declined to allow this.
121
Figure 8.
122
Figure 34.
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Awards generally give insufficient information to make an assessment of the merits of the claim, and over 50%
of filed claims are concluded by settlement that does not result in an award; see How Arbitration Cases Close,
available at http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/Statistics/index.htm.
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12 SECURITIES ARBITRATION COMMENTATOR 7 (June 2002). The study was conducted by Richard A. Voytas, Jr.
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Statistical Analysis of How Claimants Fare125 (“O’Neal/Solin Study”) analyzed SRO awards
from 1995-2004. Its findings include: (1) claimant win rates have declined since 1999, (2)
claimant win rates are lower against larger brokerage firms, (3) awards as a percent of amount
claimed have declined since 1998, and (4) the larger the case, the lower the award as a percent of
the amount claimed. Third, in 2007, the Securities Arbitration Commentator (SAC) completed a
two-part survey of SRO awards, in which it compared results in 2005 to 2000-04 results.126 Its
findings include: (1) a decline in customer win rates from 53% in 2001 to 43% in 2005 and (2) a
decline in customer median recovery rates (median award/median compensation claimed) from
47% in 2000 to 34% in 2005.
These studies arguably provide some evidence of a decline in substantive justice for
investors, but the inability to assess the merits of the claims127 and the absence of comparable
statistics for settled cases makes this evidence of limited value.128 However, we are aware of no
study that has measured the substantive fairness of securities arbitration, taking into account both
the merits of the claims and the outcomes of settled cases, nor do we think one could be readily
accomplished without more transparent awards and a healthy volume of comparable cases in
court or an independent arbitration forum.129
Appearance of Bias. A second process-related explanation is that the mere appearance of
bias from the presence of an industry arbitrator on a three-arbitrator panel fuels customers’
negative perceptions, outweighing other hallmarks of procedural fairness contained in FINRA
arbitration rules, such as requirements of notice, a right to be heard, fee waivers for demonstrated
hardship, automatic discovery and a convenient hearing location.130 Our findings lend credence
to this theory: 33.6% of customers had concerns about arbitrator bias pre-filing,131 41% did not
125

The report was authored by Edward S. O’Neal, Securities Litigation and Consulting Group, and Daniel R. Solin,
a securities arbitration attorney representing investors, and is available at http://www.smartestinvestmentbook.com/
or http://www.slcg.com/. This report is discussed further infra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
126
2006 SECURITIES ARBITRATION COMMENTATOR 1, No. 7 & 8 (Feb. 2007), 2006 SECURITIES ARBITRATION
COMMENTATOR 1, No. 2 (Apr. 2006).
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The industry, for example, accounts for the drop in investors’ win rates in recent years by asserting that many of
investors’ claims arising out of the tech crash were without merit. See SIFMA White Paper, supra note 6, at 38, 4042.
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Thus, while 37% of cases decided in 2007 awarded damages to customers, FINRA asserts that nearly 80% of
customer cases closed through settlement or award resulted in monetary or non-monetary recovery for investors; see
Results of Customer Claimant Arbitration Award Cases, available at
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believe the arbitration panel was impartial in their most recent arbitration132 and 49% of
customers disagreed with the statement that arbitration was without bias for all parties.133
SAC conducted the most thoughtful attempt to measure the presence or absence of the
industry arbitrator’s bias (“SAC Industry Arbitrator Study”).134 For 2003, it compared the win
rates for customers in Simplified Arbitrations,135 where there is only one public arbitrator, with
win rates in disputes decided by three-person panels, where one member is an industry arbitrator.
SAC recognized that a significant limitation of its survey is the different nature of the Simplified
Arbitration experience, including smaller amounts involved and the nature of the claim.136 Most
significantly, 73% of the claims were decided on the papers and not by a hearing. All these
factors make a comparison between the two categories of dubious validity. It found, for small
claims, a 42% win rate on the papers, a 58% win rate after a hearing, and, for three-person
hearings, a 51% win rate. Recognizing that attempting to extrapolate these findings into a
conclusion about the presence of the industry arbitrator is “a more difficult calculation,”137 SAC
stated that the 51% win rate of the three-person panel and the 58% win rate for a one-person
hearing prevented it from concluding that the presence of the industry arbitrator “proves neutral
to helpful.”138
To be sure, the problem of biased arbitrators is not confined to the industry arbitrator.
Investors’ advocates frequently complain that some public arbitrators consistently favor
brokerage firms, either by finding against the customer or awarding low damages amounts,
because they want brokerage firms to select them for additional cases. One empirical study
found that pro-industry arbitrators, as determined based on published awards, are selected more
often to panels than pro-investor arbitrators, particularly where a large brokerage firm is a party,
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Figure 19.
Figure 38d.
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SAC, Does the Securities Industry Arbitrator'
s Presence Create a Discernible Shift in Award Outcomes? (May
2005).
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the requested compensatory damages are large, and the customer alleges firm misconduct.139
Moreover, selection on the basis of arbitrator bias increased after FINRA changed to a system
where parties, and not the forum, selected the arbitrators.140 Ironically, the SEC approved the
adoption of the Neutral List Selection System (“NLSS”) because it believed “that allowing
parties greater input into the selection of the arbitrators to hear their cases will help ensure a
more fair and neutral arbitration process

141

Investor advocates also criticize the definition of public arbitrator as including
individuals who nonetheless have connections to the industry. A recent study focused on the role
of attorneys as arbitrators and found that panels where the chair was an attorney who represented
brokerage firms in other securities arbitrations awarded customers significantly less in
compensatory damages.142 In contrast, the study did not find that attorneys who represented
investors, or who represented both investors and firms, in securities arbitrations were more
generous in awards.143 The study also tested for the effect of the adoption of NLSS and found
that greater party involvement in the selection process correlates with a reduction in the size of
awards.144 It found no evidence that the 2004 rule changes that expanded the definition of nonpublic arbitrator and tightened the definition of public arbitrator had any effect.145 Both these
studies suggest that brokerage firms have more influence over the arbitration forum by reason of
their “repeat player” status than does the customers’ bar and that reform to place the arbitrator
selection process in the control of the parties has increased firms’ dominance. They also provide
support for investor advocates’ frequent assertion that the industry is successful in selecting
public arbitrators who will side with the industry. To some extent, the SEC’s 2007 approval of
the revised list selection system, precluding, among other things, the industry arbitrator from
139
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56670, 56681 (Oct. 22, 1998).
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serving as chairperson,146 as well as its 2008 approval of FINRA’s tightened definition of a
public arbitrator147 may redress these criticisms going forward.
Outcome Trumps All. One final process-centered explanation as to why customers
believe securities arbitration is unfair despite many procedural protections is that outcome
trumps everything. A customer, however fairly treated by objective standards, will not, in the
face of an unfavorable outcome, accept that he was treated fairly. Moreover, a customer is likely
to view as unfavorable an award of damages that is considerably less than the requested amount.
The previously mentioned recent empirical studies148 provide some support for this
explanation. In particular, the O’Neal/Solin Study149 provides an extensive review of awards in
NASD and NYSE customer arbitrations between January 1995 and December 2004.150 As with
other studies it reports on how often customers win and their recovery as a percentage of the
claimed compensatory damages and reaches conclusions consistent with other reports. Thus, it
finds that, while the overall win rate for the ten-year period was 51%, the win rates declined
from a high in 1999 of 59% to a low of 44% in 2004. It also finds that awards as a percentage of
claimed compensatory damages declined from a 1998 high of 68% to a consistent 49-50% in
2002-2004.151 In addition, this study focuses on amounts awarded in comparison with the size of
the claim and the size of the securities firm named as respondent. It finds that the greater the
amount of claimed damages, the lower the percentage of recovery; thus, the percentage of
recovery ranges from 37% in claims over $250,000 to 76% of claims of less than $10,000.152 It
also finds that the win rate was 39% against the three largest brokerage firms and 43% against
the next seventeen largest firms,153 in contrast to the overall 51% win rate. As in other studies,
the analysis necessarily cannot take into account the merits of the customers’ claims or the
reasonableness of the amount claimed as damages, as well as the outcomes of many settled
146
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outcomes that do not result in an award. Its findings, however, are at least consistent with the
frequently-expressed view that some arbitrators will rule in favor of large brokerage firms,
particularly in cases claiming a large amount in damages, because they seek the repeat
business.154 It also confirms that, for whatever reason, investors have had more difficulty
prevailing in securities arbitration in recent years. Thus, a focus solely on outcomes based on
published awards provides grounds for customers’ dissatisfaction with the process.
2.

Explanations Unrelated to the Process.

A myriad of factors unrelated to the fairness of the arbitration process itself also could
contribute to customers’ negative perceptions, some of which are necessarily more conjectural
than others.
Investors have lost money. One incontrovertible fact is that investors enter the process
after a bad investment experience in which they have lost money and/or believe that they have
been wronged by the industry. This fact is very likely to color their perceptions in a negative
way, even if they achieve an outcome that, viewed objectively, would be considered favorable.
Unrealistic Expectations. Any attorney that represents customers knows that many of
them enter the process with unrealistic expectations. Particularly if they relied on their broker’s
expertise, investors may have difficulty understanding that the broker is not responsible for the
loss of value in the portfolio unless he has violated the law or breached a duty owed to the
customer.155 In addition, investors may not realize that the applicable law in most jurisdictions is
anti-investor.156 Claimants’ attorneys also may unduly inflate their clients’ expectations about
their chances of success. Unless investors’ attorneys provide them with a realistic assessment of
their chances in arbitration, investors may view any outcome less than a full recovery as “unfair”
and “biased” and judge the process accordingly.
Dissatisfaction with Attorney. Investors’ perceptions of the arbitration process are likely
to be bound up with their assessment of the performance of the attorney who represented them.
We did not ask investors questions about their attorneys since this was a survey about the SRO
forum. However, if the investor perceived that his lawyer acted unprofessionally, we can expect
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that this would negatively color his experience.157 Ultimately, this aspect of the arbitration
experience is outside the control of the securities arbitration forum.
Contemporaneous Media Coverage. Customers’ negative perceptions could be fueled
by what they read in the media. Indeed, 39% of customers reported they had concerns about the
fairness of the process before their claim was filed.158 These concerns may stem from a variety
of sources including media coverage.
Exploring this hypothesis, we reviewed 51 articles on customers’ securities arbitration
that were printed in major newspapers between January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2006. We
determined that 46% of the articles contained objective, neutral assessments of customer
arbitration, 45% of them were critical of customer arbitration, and 8% contained favorable
assessments of the process.159 Thus, contemporaneous media coverage of securities arbitration
was far more negative than positive. Whether the media coverage’s portrayal of securities
arbitration was accurate or not is somewhat inapposite; it may well have colored customers’
subjective perceptions.
The Forum Does Not Adequately Educate Investors . One fairly obvious reaction to the
survey findings is that the securities arbitration forum does not adequately educate the users of
its services, particularly investors, as to the process and recent reforms to increase its fairness.
While there can be no doubt that additional education efforts are warranted, previous investor
education initiatives in a variety of contexts have not remedied the problems they were designed
to address.160 Thus, we are not optimistic that lack of knowledge is the sole explanation for
investors’ negative perceptions nor is it the sole target for correction.
Finally, we offer two explanations suggested by the securities industry for customers’
negative perceptions, both of which we reject.
The Study’s Methodology is Flawed. In its immediate response to the SICA Report -despite the fact that SIFMA itself is a member of SICA and thus participated in and approved of
157
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the survey’s design and methodology – SIFMA criticized the study’s methodology and thus its
findings as flawed.161 In support of its critique, however, SIFMA offers only fuzzy math (e.g., it
inaccurately reported a 10% response rate)162 and a misunderstanding of key findings (e.g., its
claim that “a large majority (58%) of persons who responded to the survey never took their cases
to a decision following an arbitration hearing” is wholly unsupported by the raw data).163 We
remain confident of the survey’s design and methodology, subject to its limitations, as we
previously described.164
The Study’s Findings Are Meaningless. SIFMA’s “knee-jerk” response also distances
itself from the survey’s findings by discounting the importance of subjective perceptions
because, in its view, many of these perceptions are at variance with objective reality.165
Specifically, it asserts that it has demonstrated that arbitration is faster and less expensive than
litigation and that industry arbitrators are not biased and do not adversely affect customer
wins.166 Accordingly, it argues, the subjective perceptions of less knowledgeable participants in
the process should be dismissed as “faulty and out of touch with the objective reality.”167
SIFMA has not demonstrated the objective reality that it asserts. It is true that the
duration of cases in arbitration is shorter than litigation.168 This fact does not conflict with some
participants’ perceptions that the arbitration hearings took too long.169 Furthermore, SIFMA
offers no recent empirical data that legal costs in securities arbitration are less than in
litigation.170 An actual comparison would not be easy to make. Filing and forum costs are
higher in arbitration than in court, but there may be overall cost savings through lower attorneys’
fees because the discovery process is more streamlined in arbitration, particularly since
161
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depositions are rarely used in arbitration. Even assuming that arbitration is less expensive than
litigation, the perceptions of 49% of customers that the arbitration process was too expensive are
not at variance with the objective reality. Customers could rationally perceive the process as too
expensive, particularly if their recovery is less than what they claimed.
The most pertinent argument made by SIFMA is its assertion that empirical evidence
establishes that industry arbitrators are not biased. SIFMA cites the SAC Industry Arbitrator
Survey171 in support of its assertion but does not explain the nuanced and tentative nature of that
survey’s findings. More disturbingly, it cites the bare percentages of win rates in Simplified
Arbitration claims and three-person panels for 2005 and 2006 as evidence of non-bias, without
accounting for the various factors that do not allow for unqualified comparisons between two
types of claims, all of which the SAC Industry Arbitrator Survey took into account. Again,
SIFMA’s “reality” is not supported by the evidence.
In our view, SIFMA’s over-reaction to our Report to SICA and its findings suggests a
more pernicious attempt to discount investors’ opinions and obscure the need for reform.172
Since SIFMA’s stated mission includes “earning, inspiring and upholding the public’s trust in the
industry…,”173 it is puzzling that SIFMA uncritically champions a system that many investors
perceive as unfair and that contributes to distrust of the industry. Strategically, SIFMA
apparently has decided that unconditional support for the current system is the best tactic to
oppose the proposed legislation eliminating mandatory consumer arbitration. Thus, SIFMA
identified as a “key project” for 2008 the defense of “pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate in the
SRO-sponsored forum,”174 it testified in Congress against the application of the Arbitration
Fairness Act to securities arbitration,175 and the SIFMA White Paper is largely a promotion piece
for what it describes as “the success story of an investor protection focused institution that has
delivered timely, cost-effective, and fair results for over 30 years.”176 While we agree with
SIFMA that securities arbitration cannot usefully be compared to “some idealized, utopian
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version” of litigation177 we reject the assertion that investors’ perceptions of the securities
arbitration system should not be taken into account in reforming the process.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whatever the underlying explanation, we have no doubt that our survey results are
illuminating as to subjective perceptions by arbitration participants of fairness, albeit
inconclusive as to objective standards of fairness. As stated above,178 subjective perceptions are
important because participants’ views of fairness, particularly procedural fairness, are critical to
the integrity of the dispute resolution process.179 Simply put, even if the system meets objective
standards of fairness, a mandatory system that is not perceived as doing so cannot maintain the
confidence of its users and, in the long run, may not be sustainable. As a result, customers’
negative perceptions are changing the realities of the current system of securities arbitration and
require a re-thinking by policy-makers.
Accordingly, based on the findings of our Report, we urge the SEC and FINRA to give
serious consideration to eliminating the requirement of an industry arbitrator on every threeperson arbitration panel.180 Rightly or wrongly, investors are simply suspicious of a mandatory
process with an opaque outcome that is sponsored by the regulatory arm of the securities
industry and that includes an industry representative on every three-arbitrator panel hearing a
claim greater than $25,000. The frequently-made argument – that no one can prove that the
presence of an industry arbitrator harms the investor – misses the point. Given the widespread
distrust of the industry arbitrator, it would seem that the presence of an industry arbitrator would
have to contribute great value to the process -- which no one can establish either -- to justify the
continuation of this practice. We are less convinced about the value of requiring arbitrators to
177
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explain their awards at the request of the customer, because of the dangers it will lead to more
attempts to vacate awards and thus prolong the arbitration process. However, based on our
findings, we believe that this proposed reform should be revisited.
Despite FINRA’s commendable efforts to improve the process, these efforts will likely
prove unsuccessful in winning customers’ confidence so long as they are required to accept both
an industry arbitrator and an unexplained award. While SIFMA’s dismissive and patronizing
response to customers appears to be “get over it,” we submit that this is not a helpful response.
Rather, in light of these findings of customers’ dissatisfaction and perceptions of unfairness, the
indisputable reality is that it is incumbent upon regulators, the forum and the industry to work
toward further improvements in the system.
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APPENDIX A

SICA

Securities Industry
Conference on
Arbitration

Date

«PREFIX» «FIRST_NAME» «MIDDLE_NAME» «LAST_NAME»
«TITLE»
«COMPANY»
«ADDRESS_1»
«ADDRESS_2»
«CITY», «STATE_PROVINCE» «ZIP»
RE:

Securities Arbitration Fairness Survey - 2007

Dear «PREFIX» «LAST_NAME»:
Over the past twenty years, arbitration has become the primary method of resolving
disputes in the securities industry. Recently, a report to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) recommended independent research to evaluate the fairness of securities
arbitration.
The Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA), a group created with the
encouragement of the SEC and made up of representatives of securities regulators, the securities
industry and public investors, has commissioned the Pace Investor Rights Project (affiliated with
Pace University School of Law) to conduct a survey to evaluate the fairness of the arbitration of
customer claims at both NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. (“NASD”) and the New York Stock
Exchange (“NYSE”). This survey has been developed with our input and support, and will be
administered through Cornell University’s Survey Research Institute. Our mission is to study
whether participants believe the securities arbitration process is conducted simply, fairly,
economically and without bias by the arbitrators.
We need YOUR participation and feedback. You are receiving this survey because
NASD or NYSE records show that you were involved in a dispute that was filed for arbitration
in its forum in the last five years. Please take a few minutes to complete the questionnaire below
and return it in the self-addressed postage-paid return envelope provided. Please be assured that
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your responses will be kept completely confidential and will never be used in any way to permit
identification of you. Your responses will be used only in aggregate form. We hope that you
will complete and return it as soon as possible.
We greatly appreciate your cooperation. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate
to call the Survey Research Institute at 1-888-367-8404.
Sincerely,

Constantine N. Katsoris
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